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Abstract
The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in
science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an
evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner’s Dilemma on signed networks.
The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strate-
gies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded
in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable
conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we
found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with
relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While
a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit
its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation becomes more
prevalent in denser topologies.
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; signed graphs; network dynamics; negative
ties; agent-based models.
1 Introduction
The reasons and the conditions for the evolution of cooperative behavior in human communi-
ties remain one of the most actively targeted puzzles in science [1, 2, 3, 6, 13, 34, 35, 36, 51].
The topic has been extensively studied by evolutionary game theory, which focuses on the
dynamic change of strategies in populations of interacting agents subject to natural selection
pressures. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is frequently used to model the problem of
cooperation as it very clearly depicts the paradox concerned [14, 38]. The PD describes
∗MTA TK ”Lendu¨let” Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (RECENS), Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences. Mailing address: Orsza´gha´z utca 30, 1014 Budapest, Hungary. Email: si-
mone.righi@tk.mta.hu
†MTA TK ”Lendu¨let” Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (RECENS), Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences. Mailing address: Orsza´gha´z utca 30, 1014 Budapest, Hungary. Email:
takacs.karoly@tk.mta.hu
1
a symmetric setup in which two players can choose between two alternative strategies: to
cooperate or to defect. Defection provides players with higher payoffs than cooperation,
regardless of the other individual’s choice. Mutual defection, however, is suboptimal to
mutual cooperation. In this game, defection is the dominant strategy, but it results in a
Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. Moreover, from an evolutionary perspective, defection is the
sole evolutionary stable stategy (ESS).
It was shown previously that cooperation can be sustained if social dilemma games (such
as the PD) are played in networks, with interactions taking place only between immediate
neighbors [23, 24, 32, 37, 41, 48]. The sparseness of interactions allows groups of cooperators
to invade populations of defectors [36, 37, 41]. The network structure is important because
persistent social ties (both direct and indirect) can be used to control behavior, which thus
contributes to the establishment of cooperation through reputation mechanisms, such as
image scoring [51]. The introduction of structured interactions opens the question of which
network topologies sustain or foster cooperation. The literature has frequently adopted a
numerical approach (e.g., [23, 33]) to this problem, as the evolution of cooperation is beyond
analytical reach even when behavior evolves in a fixed interaction topology [32, 37, 47].
Further results have been obtained with the aid of agent-based simulations for evolving
networks [41, 49, 52, 53]. In this context, it has been shown that the possibility of exclusion,
exit, and partner selection favor the emergence of cooperation [42, 46, 52].
Virtually all studies that analyze the co-evolution of network structure and cooperation
assume only positive relations between players. In this paper, we introduce negative ties with
the assumption that they may act as accelerators of cooperation as suggested by both the
literature on the efficiency of altruistic punishment [4, 9, 12, 15, 16], and on stigmatization
and social exclusion [30, 31]. Including negative ties allows us to capture the dyadic social-
psychological mechanisms of vengeance and anger, which are generally modeled with trigger
strategies in the context of repeated PD games [1, 2, 3, 45]. However, the main enhancement
the model can offer with the integration of negative ties is that they allow for effective rep-
resentation of emotions that encode relevant reputational information. Speculations about
why emotions have evolved in humans are in fact largely linked to their function in human
interaction [8, 17, 29, 45]. Individuals do not keep exact records of all their interactions,
but use affection, sentiments (e.g., like, dislike) and emotions as simplified tools of recall.
Relational signs are simple information that is easy to remember and costless to maintain
between potential partners, and can thus act as effective signals of cooperative intentions.
Feelings shape and are shaped by the interaction experience with partners. On the one
hand, relations in everyday life are filled with emotions that trigger appropriate behavioral
responses. On the other hand, sentiments partly replace factual bookkeeping of interactions
and, at the same time, constitute effective reputational signals, as they change as a conse-
quence of partners’ behavior. In our setup, relational signs make the model more realistic,
as they represent the emotions towards interacting partners.
In this paper we focus on the role of emotions in a setting where the single shot PD
is played and where relational signs, network topology and the agents’ strategies co-evolve.
We show that a simple strategy that is conditional on the direct relational sign with the
partner, but does not have a memory of past choices, catalyzes the chances of cooperation
to become dominant. Unlike universal cooperation (UC) and universal defection (UD), the
emotional conditional strategy (COND) triggers different responses of the same individual
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towards different partners. COND prescribes cooperation with those who are liked (positive
relational sign) and defection with those who are disliked (negative relational sign). 1 In our
simulations, COND played against other strategies without memory (UC and UD) and we
explored how the inclusion of this strategy affected the prevalence of cooperative behavior
under different parametric conditions. Different strategies induce different choices in the
game and thus create asymmetric emotional experiences that can result in emotional tension.
We assume that such tension is resolved by a probabilistic and non-strategic sign update or
by elimination and rewiring of the relationship.
First, we manipulated the proportion of the agents playing the emotional strategy at
the outset and the likelihood of network updates, showing that the presence of conditional
strategies facilitates the evolution of cooperation. We show that rewiring is necessary for
cooperation to emerge but it hampers its diffusion when it becomes the dominant force.
Moreover, we determine the parametric conditions under which the presence of emotional
strategies facilitates the evolution of cooperation in signed networks. We compare our find-
ings with those observed in the literature on games in unsigned networks and note both
similarities and differences. We observe that the presence of negative ties reverses the results
of [37], as we show that network density increases the chances of cooperation to endure. Not-
ing that the frequency of sign updates has a relatively minor effect on results, we focus on
the exploration of the relative importance of network updates compared to strategy updates.
In line with the literature on positive ties [41] we find that more frequent network updates
provide favorable conditions for cooperation, as they allow cooperators to be matched with
cooperators, while evolutionary updates support the strategy with a higher payoff, i.e., de-
fection. Most importantly, the presence of emotional strategies enlarges the parameter set
under which cooperation survives.
We study these questions in networks the sizes of which are calibrated to resemble that
of human ancestors’ communities [10]. In line with most of the literature, we provide results
for a model in which the average payoff from all dyadic interactions determines individual
fitness.
In the subsequent sections of the paper, we introduce our model (Section 2), present our
results in detail (Section 3), and discuss their importance and limitations (Section 4).
2 The Model
Consider a set of agents N . Each agent i ∈ N is placed on a node in a non-weighted non-
directed signed network. Agents are characterized by a type and by a set of connections
with a subset of the whole population Fi ⊂ N . Network ties, which constrain the possibility
of playing a two-person single-shot PD, are signed and each of them is either negative or
positive. Strategy types define the behavior of the agents in the PD. Specifically, there are
three types of strategies:
• Unconditional Defector. This type of agent always defects regardless of the sign of his
relationships. Both the strategy and the agents playing it are labeled UD.
1COND is similar to Tit-for-Tat (TFT), with the difference that the former does not recall previous
choices and is therefore a strategy for the single-shot PD.
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• Unconditional Cooperator (UC). This type of agent always cooperates, regardless of
the sign of the tie with the partner.
• Conditional Player (COND). The behavior of this agent is determined by the sign of
the tie he shares with the current partner in the PD game. Specifically, he cooperates
with agents he shares a positive tie with and defects with agents he has a negative tie
with. 2
The agents play the Prisoner’s Dilemma, characterized by the classical payoff structure,
with each of their neighbors (see Table 1). During every dyadic interaction, agents observe
the link sign and play according to their type.
C D
C (R = 3, R = 3) (S = 0, T = 5)
D (T = 5, S = 0) (P = 1, P = 1)
Table 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix (T > R > P > S). The numerical payoffs
used here are the same as in [1].
The dynamics of our model allows for the co-evolution of relational signs, agent strate-
gies, and network structure. Time is divided in discrete periods and simulations continue
until equilibrium is reached. 3 The intra-step dynamics is summarized in Algorithm 1. At
each time step t, each agent i contemporaneously plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma with all
agents in his current first order social neighborhood, i.e., with each j ∈ F t−1i . After each
dyadic interaction, emotional tension may emerge as a consequence of the behavior of the
agents. Emotional tension emerges if and only if the interacting partners opted for a differ-
ent action (one cooperates and the other defects). This can be solved either by deleting the
problematic relationship and substituting it with a new one, or with a sign update of the
current relationship. Both cases require a more detailed discussion provided in the following.
Subsequently, each agent computes his average payoff and compares it with that of peers in
the direct neighborhood (i.e., with all those he has played with). In case one or more of the
neighbors have a payoff higher than his own, he adopts (with probability Padopt) the strategy
played by one of them, selected uniformly at random. As the order in which the agents are
selected for update should not make a difference in evolution, update is done in parallel. The
literature on the PD played in networks has consistently showed that when individual fitness
is determined on the basis of the average payoff in all individual encounters, the proportion
of cooperators increases with respect to the case in which updates are made after each dyadic
2We do not consider strategies that are conditional on the valence of the tie in the opposite way: cooperate
in the case of a negative tie and defect in the case of a positive tie.
3To consider a state as equilibrium, two strict conditions must be met. First, the simulation cannot end
before a transitory period of 150 steps has expired. Second, the configuration of relational signs, network
topology, and agent types need to be precisely the same in five randomly determined periods of time. Each
t had a probability 0.1 to be selected for this end rule. When at least two periods were selected, they
were compared. If their configuration was not exactly the same, then simulation continued and new ts were
randomly selected for the end rule. Robustness checks have been performed and the results are stable with
alternative parameterizations of the end rule.
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interaction [49]. 4 This is also the case in our model (see [40]). We will therefore limit our
analysis to the situation in which individual fitness is determined as the average payoff from
all dyadic interactions with neighbors.
For each agent i
Compute its social neighborhood F t−1i ∈ N
For each agent j ∈ F t−1i
Let i and j play the PD according to their types in t− 1 and determine outcome
Update relational signs between i and j for t
If i cooperated and j defected, Then
with probability Prew delete the link between i and j ...
... and connect i to somebody in its second order neighborhood
end
end
Compute the average payoff in t of agent i
end
For each agent i
Observe the average payoffs of period t for each agent j ∈ F t−1i
Adopt a random (strictly) better strategy in j ∈ F t−1i (with probability Padopt)
end
All rewirings are observed.
All relational signs become effective.
New agent types become effective.
Algorithm 1. Intra-step dynamics, repeated at each time step t.
There are three main mechanisms that drive the evolution of our model. The first is
the relational sign update, which allows the agents’ behavior to influence the nature of their
relationship. The second is the rewiring of tense links, through which the agents’ behavior
influence the structure of social interactions. The third is the adoption of a better strategy,
through which the agents update their behavior in order to improve their welfare. For each
of these mechanisms, we selected simple and yet empirically founded updating rules. Let us
discuss each of these building blocks in detail.
Relational sign updates model the consequences of behavior in the PD on the emo-
tional content of relations with peers. When two players cooperate they are both satisfied
with the outcome. An existing positive link thus remains positive, and a negative one be-
comes positive. For similar reasons, when both agents defect, a positive relation becomes
negative and a negative one remains so. More problematic is the situation in which behaviors
differ: one agent cooperates while the other defects. In this case the emotional content of
the relationship is subject to tension. The defecting partner is content to remain friends
with the cooperator. In fact, a positive relationship to the cooperator provides him with a
strictly higher payoff if he is paired with a COND player, whose action is sensitive to the
sign of their relationship. If the link is negative, the defector might be interested in turning
4The choice of using the average payoff instead of sum relies on the fact that we want a measure of
performance independent of the degree.
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it into a positive tie. We assume that it happens with probability Ppos. The cooperating
agent is, however, frustrated by the partner’s behavior and may want to change a positive
link to negative with some probability Pneg. It is logical to assume that the frustration of
the cooperator in the latter case is stronger than the will of the defector to turn the troubled
relationship positive. Therefore, we assume that Pneg >> Ppos.
5
It should be noted that, while all links are signed and evolve as a consequence of the
behavior adopted in interactions between partners, only COND acts on them conditionally.
Hence, COND is the only truly emotional strategy in our model. Meanwhile, also UCs and
UDs update their network signs in certain situations. This way, we separated the automatic
update of network signs from the evolution and spread of strategies. Consequently, similarly
to other evolutionary models, we are able to make fair comparisons about the evolutionary
success of conditional cooperation and other simple strategies in the PD.
The second update mechanism in our model is rewiring, through which network topology
changes endogenously as a consequence of the agents’ behavior. A similar mechanism has
been studied by [41]. A cooperator, frustrated by the behavior of a defecting partner,
may decide to delete the social connection altogether. We assume that such a choice is
made non-strategically with probability Prew (or rewiring probability). When rewiring takes
place, a new link is created with another agent. In line with the sociological literature on
partnership formation, we assume that new links are created more frequently with players
at social distance two. In other words, there is a certain tendency to transitive closure [21].
More precisely, we assume that a new link connects the frustrated cooperator with someone
who is a friend of his friends. The new link is initially positive. This restriction excludes the
possibility of the formation of ties with the friend of an enemy or with the enemy of a friend,
and naturally increases clustering in the network. In order to introduce some noise into this
process, with a probability Prand rewiring is done with a random agent in the population.
6
The third element required for an evolutionary model as ours is a strategy update rule
that determines how successful strategies are adopted by others. At each time step and for
each agent i, the average payoff across all his interactions is calculated. The agent compares
his payoff with the ones of all his peers in his first order social neighborhood (i.e., all those
he has played with). If a subset of agents in Fi has a payoff higher than his own, agent
i adopts the strategy played by one of the agents in this pool of better performing peers,
selected uniformly at random. Strategy update happens, for each agent, with probability
Padopt.
Finally, in order to focus on some key parameters, we made a few additional assump-
tions about other variables and calibrated our simulations consequently. For the sake
of simplicity, we initialized relations according to an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph [11]. 7
5Note that tension in a particular dyad is always asymmetric. The probabilities Ppos and Pneg are
therefore never applied at the same time to any particular dyad. In most simulations reported here, we fixed
Pneg = 0.2 and Ppos = 0.1. These values are assumed equal for all agents. We have run simulations also for
other parameter values and observed that all results are robust to these changes. An analysis of alternative
parameter values is reported in the Appendix.
6This parameter was fixed at Prand = 0.01 in the main simulations of this paper. However, as shown in
the Appendix, the main results have been qualitatively preserved even for the extreme case of purely random
relinking (Prand = 1).
7We address alternative network initializations in another paper [39].
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Each pair of nodes was connected with an independent probability Plink (i.e., each pos-
sible link existed with probability Plink). Moreover, at the outset, the agents were ran-
domly assigned with one of the three strategies in proportions (µUC , µUD, µCOND) ∈ [0; 1]
s.t. (µUC + µUD + µCOND) ≡ 1. In all simulations reported we assumed µUC = µUD. Fi-
nally, relational signs were randomly distributed and initialized so that each link had the
probability 1/2 of being either negative or positive. 8
3 Results
Fixed networks. In the absence of emotional strategies (COND) and rewiring, the dy-
namics of our model converges to a state dominated by unconditional defection and negative
signs. In this baseline setup, UCs are systematically cheated on by UDs. Sign changes do not
influence the outcome as cooperators do not act upon them. Thus, the baseline dynamics
leads to a Hobbesian state dominated by defection and dislike.
Moreover, if the network topology is fixed, the introduction of conditional players is not
sufficient to guarantee the dissemination of cooperation. To study the impact of CONDs, at
the outset we manipulated the initial proportion of the population that plays this strategy
and we observed the proportions of agent types and that of network signs at the end of the
simulation (Figure 1). The conditional strategy did not disappear (the sum of proportions
of UC and UD was persistently smaller than one), and remained more likely in the final
population in case its initial proportion was higher. Conditional agents, however, became
functionally undistinguishable from unconditional defectors since all ties were negative.
Since the presence of some evolution of network topology (rewiring) is a necessary con-
dition in order to observe cooperation, in the subsequent simulations we assume Prew > 0.
Moreover, when it is not stated otherwise, the initial proportion of each agent’s type in the
population is assumed to be the same. As it is noted in Table 2 and shown in the next sec-
tions, cooperation can emerge as a dominant behavior in our setup, if the network topology
is dynamic and conditional players are present. In the following, we thus concentrate on this
sub-case.
Prew = 0 Prew > 0
µCOND =
0
No cooperation Cooperation through
clustering of strategies
µCOND >
0
Some cooperation,
only if µCOND → 1
Cooperation sur-
vival/diffusion
Table 2: Summary of the results. A positive rewiring probability and the presence of condi-
tional strategies are both required for the spread of unconditional cooperation
3.1 Emotional strategies as catalysts for cooperation
Our main goal is to uncover the impact of emotional strategies, and hence negative re-
lational signs, on the evolution of cooperation. Our results produce convincing evidence
8Results from alternative parametrizations are available upon request.
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Figure 1: The final proportion of UCs, UDs and of negative signs in the network as the
initial proportion of CONDs increases and the network topology is fixed (i.e., Prew = 0).
Each data point represents the average and the standard deviation of values obtained from
100 simulations. In each simulation N = 200, Plink = 0.05, Pneg = 0.2, Pneg = 0.1 and
Prand = 0.01. The presence of COND affects positively the prevalence of cooperative behavior
only if more than 80% of the population starts with this strategy.In this range, however, the
high proportion of CONDs makes any result possible, hence the high variability of results.
that the COND strategy largely facilitates the emergence and the diffusion of unconditional
cooperation in a mixed population.
The Upper Panels of Figure 2 illustrate the co-evolution of proportions of strategy types
and of network signs in the absence and in the presence of emotional conditional strate-
gies in two simulation runs, where all other parameter values were left identical. Without
conditional players, universal defectors always gain dominance and the population reaches
the Hobbesian state with everyone defecting and all ties being negative. The population
dynamics when conditional strategies are present can be different. The share of agents using
the COND strategy decreases over time and thus this strategy does not become prevalent
in the population. Its presence, however, assists universal cooperators to gain dominance.
At the same time, the network reaches a state with an overwhelming proportion of positive
relations. The Lower Panels of Figure 2 report on the distribution of outcomes in a set of 100
simulations. This confirms that without CONDs, defection dominates and the Hobbesian
state is the only outcome. With the introduction of the emotional strategy, however, the
distribution of the results becomes bimodal for the parameters chosen, showing the existence
of two clearly distinct cases. Besides the dynamics where defection becomes dominant, a
second case emerges where cooperative behavior and positive signs dominate.
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Figure 2: Upper Panels: Dynamics of the proportions of agent types and network signs
in typical simulations. In the Left Panel, the population is initialized as equally divided
between UCs and UDs. In the Right Panel, the population is divided equally among UC,
UD, and COND strategies. Lower Panels: The distribution (calculated on 100 simulations)
of the final proportions of UDs, UCs, and negative ties without (Left Panel) and with (Right
Panel) conditional players. For all simulations: N=200, Prew = Padopt = 0.1, Pneg = 0.2,
Pneg = 0.1 and Prand = 0.01. The network signs were randomly initialized as positive or
negative with equal probability and the probability of existence for each tie was Plink = 0.05.
The COND strategy facilitates the spread of UCs, but does not become dominant itself in
the population. This is a remarkable result in itself, which originates from two distinct micro-
mechanisms. First, COND efficiently copes with defectors, and prevents the exploitation of
UCs by UDs partly. Second, when the COND strategy is played in mixed neighborhoods,
it gains higher payoffs than UDs and lower payoffs than UCs on average. Hence, CONDs
tend to conquer neighboring sites occupied by unconditional defectors, while their original
positions are taken over by unconditional cooperators. This mechanism extends the area of
cooperation in the network progressively. Rewiring emotionally tense dyads reinforces this
process, contributing to less exposure of UCs to UDs (through the elimination of the links
9
between agents playing strategies which induces different behaviors). In the absence of either
emotional strategies or rewiring, the UCs are exposed to direct contact to UDs more often.
In a direct interaction, the former is always payoff-dominated by the latter and thus tends
to disappear.
Next, we assess the contribution of emotional strategies to the evolution of cooperation
more systematically. We manipulated the initial proportion of CONDs, progressively in-
creasing it from zero to one, while dividing the rest of the population between UCs and UDs
in identical shares. The results, reported in Figure 3, confirm the existence of two different
types of equilibrium, the characteristics of which are quite similar across different initial
shares of CONDs. In the first type of equilibrium, cooperation dominates and relational
signs become mostly positive (Top Left Panel). In this case, it is interesting to note that
unconditional cooperation becomes the most diffused form of cooperation regardless of the
initial share of CONDs. The second type of equilibrium (Top Right Panel) is dominated
by defection. In this case, unconditional cooperation disappears completely, while the con-
ditional players, albeit marginal in number, become all defectors. The share of CONDs in
the population determines which of the two types of equilibrium appears more often. The
Bottom Left Panel of Figure 3 clearly indicates a negative relation between the initial pro-
portion of CONDs and the share of simulations in which defection dominates. In this sense,
increasing the share of agents making use of relational signs makes cooperation more likely
to emerge. The co-existence of the two types of equilibrium here depends on the fact that we
studied a situation in which the two main drivers of the dynamics (probability of rewiring
and that of strategy update) have equal strength, that is, Prew = Padopt. As we will show in
the insets of Figure 4 and in Figure 7 (in Appendix), by manipulating the relative strengths
of these two evolutionary forces, we can characterize the situation in which the number of
equilibrium states is reduced to one and defection never dominates. Indeed, as we will note
in Section 3.2, the multiple possible equilibrium states are reduced to one when the two
dynamics differ significantly. Moreover, the still significant variance in the results displayed
here reduces as network size increases (see the discussion in Section 3.4).
The Bottom Right Panel of Figure 3 presents a more general experiment where both the
initial proportion of conditional agents and the rewiring probability are manipulated. 9 In
order to correctly interpret this study, it is important to note that only the two leftmost
columns report on simulations which ended with defection dominating. This is due to the
relative strength of Prew and that of Padopt, the role of which in driving the results is studied
systematically in Section 3.2. Shifting our attention to the rest of the Panel, we can no-
tice that while the presence of some rewiring allows cooperation to become prevalent, too
much of it can also limit its diffusion. For any given initial proportion of CONDs, as Prew
increases, the proportion of UCs decreases and the proportion of negative signs increases at
the end of the simulations. This interesting result is a by-product of the progressive diffu-
sion of unconditional cooperation through the catalyzation effect produced by the emotional
9Only the proportion of UCs is reported as all relevant information can be deduced from it. The final
proportion of CONDs is homogeneous across the parameter space at a value around 0.25 ± 0.01. The
proportion of UDs decreases progressively and monotonically as the initial proportion of CONDs increases,
regardless of the rewiring probability. The proportion of negative signs is complementary to the proportion
of UCs; with the maximum value where the UCs are at a minimum and vice-versa. Graphs and data are
available upon request.
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Figure 3: Top Panels: mean and standard deviation of the proportion of negative signs, UDs
and UCs at the end of the simulations as a function of the initial proportion of CONDs. Two
types of equilibrium states exist: one in which cooperative behavior dominates (Left Panel)
and one in which defection dominates (Right Panel). The proportion of the simulations in
which defection dominates is reported in the Bottom Left Panel, for the cases Prand = 0.01
and Prand = 1. In these simulations Prew = Padopt = 0.1. Results reported in Top Panels are
similar for both Prand = 0.01 and Prand = 1. Bottom Right Panel: final proportion of UCs
as the initial proportion of CONDs (vertical axis) and the rewiring probabilities (horizontal
axis) are changed. In all simulations: Padopt = 0.1, N = 200, Pneg = 0.2, Pneg = 0.1 and
Prand = 0.01. Network signs are initially randomly positive or negative with equal probability
and the probability of existence for each tie is Plink = 0.05.
strategy. As soon as there is some rewiring, some tense links are deleted, and this leads
to an increase in the final proportion of cooperators. When rewiring is relatively low, the
ties that are deleted are those that are more likely to produce tension, i.e., those that link
agents to UDs. When the rewiring probability increases, however, the links between CONDs
and UCs, which can be initially negative, are also deleted before having the opportunity of
becoming positive. When this happens, the emotional strategy tends to become segregated
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from unconditional cooperation thus reducing the effectiveness of the synergy between these
two strategies, which is at the core of the effective diffusion of cooperation in our model. One
obvious way of compensating for this phenomenon is to increase the proportion of CONDs,
as this reduces the impact of the segregating force of rewiring.
With this first set of results, we showed that the presence of emotional strategies at the
outset is necessary for the evolution of cooperation in the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
played in signed networks. Emotional strategies did not gain dominance themselves, but
acted as catalysts for cooperation. The higher their initial proportion was, the better the
chances were, in the aggregate, for universal cooperators to outperform, and therefore elim-
inate, unconditional defectors.
3.2 Low adoption probability and high rewiring support cooper-
ation
Our model integrates two main dynamic forces that drive the evolution of cooperation and
that can be compared with similar mechanisms in the literature. First, the agents tend to
adopt those strategies in their social neighborhood that perform better. Second, stressed
relationships can be rewired. To analyze the joint influence of these two dynamics, we
systematically changed their relative strength (measured as their probability to happen at
each time step and interaction). Figure 4 shows the results for Padopt ∈ [0, 1] and Prew ∈ [0, 1],
where the values of both variables were changed progressively in steps of 0.05. For each
combination of parameters, we ran 50 simulations. The averages are reported in Figure 4.
In addition, the relative standard deviations are reported in the Appendix in Figure 7.
Figure 4 shows that cooperation is sustained for relatively low invasion and high rewiring
probabilities. This is in line with the findings of the literature for positive networks. The
rewiring of stressed connections enhances the segregation of the agents by type of strategies
for any adoption probability. In the context of this model, this decreases the chances of
observing negative signs and thus limits the spread of UDs in the population, fostering
instead the emergence of a cooperative synergy between CONDs and UCs.
The results also confirm that, for any rewiring probability, when the likelihood of adoption
of more fitting strategies is higher than a threshold, cooperative behavior disappears. Indeed,
the speed of update positively affects the proportion of those agents in the population that
adopt the strategy with a higher payoff in the dyadic PD (i.e., unconditional defection), thus
enhancing its diffusion in the population.
In the absence of CONDs (Top Panels), the two dynamic forces have similar strengths,
with a slight advantage for strategy adoption (in the sense that it is required that Prew >
Padopt in order for the cooperation to be sustained). Moreover, the proportion of cooperators
who survive at the end of the simulation increases with the size of the difference Prew−Padopt.
A similar reasoning applies to the progressive decrease of the proportion of negative ties.
Since the proportion of the unconditional cooperators is never above its initial value (50% of
the population) in the absence of emotional strategies, we can conclude that the prevelance
of cooperation mainly depends on the speed with which cooperators manage to get isolated
from defectors (as in [41]).
Introducing CONDs in the population produces subtle but important changes. To high-
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Figure 4: The effect of the competing dynamics of strategy adoption (vertical axis) and
rewiring of stressed links (horizontal axis) on the final proportion of negative ties in the
network (Left Panels), of UDs (Central Panels) and of UCs (Right Panels). The Top Panels
show the results in the absence of Conditional Players. The Middle Panels show the results
in the case of populations that initially included one third of each strategy. The Lower Panels
show the difference in observed proportions with respect to the case in which no CONDs
are present at the onset. In all simulations N=200, Pneg = 0.2, Pneg = 0.1 and Prand =
0.01.. Network signs are initially randomly positive or negative with equal probability. The
probability of the existence of a tie is Plink = 0.05.
light them, we need to study the last two rows of Figure 4. First, the area that guarantees the
survival of cooperative strategies is extended and now encompasses the values Prew ≈ Padopt
too. Second, when cooperation is supported, the proportion of UCs can rise above its initial
value, and in some cases even above the initial sum of conditional players and unconditional
cooperators. This is the case when the adoption probability is sufficiently smaller than the
rewiring probability. Under other parameter conditions in which cooperation survives, the
presence of the emotional strategy can also lower the proportion of unconditional coopera-
tors. This, however, gives advantage to the CONDs themselves and not to the unconditional
defectors. A dynamic environment with a high probability of rewiring associated with a high
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probability of adoption makes the emotional strategy powerful. CONDs tend to diffuse since
they obtain systematically higher payoffs when they find themselves in mixed environments
of both UCs and UDs. The intensity of the adoption rate makes it possible for CONDs to
spread both in the direction of UDs and of UCs. Under these conditions, since the network
rewires relatively fast, the conditional agents tend to dominate the population when the
equilibrium is reached.
The Lower Panels of Figure 4 compare cases with and without the presence of emotional
strategies. These Panels are calculated by taking the difference between the averages in the
two cases. The negative values thus indicate a decrease in the proportion of the variable
observed as a consequence of the introduction of conditional players. Overall, across the
whole spectrum of the parameters studied, the introduction of emotional strategies reduces
both the proportion of unconditional defectors and the proportion of negative ties in the
network. The size of the difference is larger in the transitional area in which the two com-
peting dynamics studied have almost the same strength, since the introduction of CONDs
there allows for the survival of cooperation where it was impossible before.
We noted in connection with Figure 2 that the dynamics of our model can lead to two
possible outcomes, one dominated by cooperative behavior, and the other dominated by de-
fection. The extensive analysis performed here allows us to understand which type of equilib-
rium dominates. When rewiring is the strongest dynamic force, the cooperative-dominated
equilibrium is the only outcome. The distribution of outcomes across 50 simulations is re-
ported for the illustrative case Prew = 0.3 and Padopt = 0.1 in the insets in the second row of
Figure 4. When the adoption probability is too strong, only defection-dominated configura-
tions are found. Between the two areas a sharp phase transition occurs where we can observe
the bimodal distribution of Figure 2. The general validity of this observation is shown in
Figure 7 in the Appendix, where the standard deviations of the results are presented.
3.3 Robustness checks
In the previous section we studied the impact of adoption and rewiring probabilities, by
fixing the amount of sign-switches respectively at Pneg = 0.2 and Ppos = 0.1. However, a
complete analysis of our model requires some understanding of the impact of these variables.
We repeated the simulations presented in Figure 4 by progressively increasing the values of
Pneg and Ppos, while maintaining their ratio. The results are reported in Figure 8 (in the
Appendix) for the case Ppos = 0.2 and Pneg = 0.4 as well as for the case Ppos = 0.4 and
Pneg = 0.8. The structure of outcomes for different adoption and rewiring probabilities re-
mains qualitatively similar to the one just discussed. The most noticeable change occurs in
the area around the phase transition between the parameter combinations where defection
dominates and where cooperation prevails. Here, an increase in the sign-switching proba-
bility significantly decreases the number of negative ties and that of UDs, while increasing
the proportion of UCs. This result indicates that, during the phase transition when the
two outcomes are possible, the proportion of outcomes dominated by cooperation increases
with the amounts of sign-switch. Above the phase transition (Padopt > Pcond), the number of
unconditional defectors decreases, but this variation does not result in changes in the pro-
portion of UCs or of negative signs. This hints at the fact that the missing UDs are defecting
CONDs, who are functionally equivalent to pure defectors. Finally, below the phase transi-
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tion (Padopt < Pcond), UC domination increases with the probability of sign changes. Once
again, changing the sign-switch probabilities does not have an impact on the measure of co-
operative behavior, only on the balance between conditional and unconditional cooperation.
We can therefore conclude that while some quantitative differences occur as we change the
speed of sign-switching relative to other dynamic forces, our results are qualitatively resilient
to these changes.
Another piece of criticism one could level at our model is that our rewiring mechanism
endogenously creates clusters of cooperators thus increasing the cooperation when enough
rewiring is introduced. In the attempt of modeling the rewiring process in line with the
sociological literature, we assumed that new links can only be created among friends of
friends. An alternative model specification is to assume that new links are created at random.
To analyze the impact of this alternative specification, we performed two sets of simulations
setting Prand = 1 and keeping all other relevant parameters equal. The first set reproduces the
test of the impact of the proportion of CONDs on cooperation, while the second reproduces
the analysis of the joint effect of adoption and rewiring probability. Both are reported, in
Figure 3 and in Figure 9 (in the Appendix), respectively. The first set of results shows that
there are still two types of equilibrium, and that their type is the same as when Prand << 1.
We underline, however, that at each level of COND, the proportion of simulations in which
the population converges to the defection-dominated equilibrium is consistently higher with
random rewiring. The reason for the decrease in the share of cooperative type of equilibrium
is that a purely random rewiring reduces the segregation effect produced by our baseline
setup, making it less likely for cooperation to emerge. Figure 9 also shows, nevertheless, that
a sharp decrease in cooperation is limited to the area around the phase transition. In the
area where unconditional cooperation dominates with transitive update, it does even more so
with the random rewiring procedure. This is a surprising result and indicates that rewiring
based on transitive closure provides an advantage for cooperation in the critical parameter
domain, while a random rewiring procedure is a more efficient engine for dissemination
when the conditions for cooperation are highly favorable. This is in line with the literature
on the diffusion of innovations, which highlights the limitations for the spread in the case
of transitive closure and demonstrates the efficiency of bridging (or random) ties in the
process [5, 21, 50]. Furthermore, we point out that with random rewiring, the proportion of
UCs only depends on the adoption probability and not on the degree of rewiring. This is a
consequence of the fact that the random procedure has a neutral effect on the segregation
of different strategies, therefore, even when the rewiring happens fast, the slow-down in
the diffusion of cooperation does not happen. Summing up, the introduction of a random
rewiring mechanism as a substitute of the one discussed before brings quantitative changes
into our model but preserves our main results, concerning the effects of negative ties and
emotional strategies on cooperation.
3.4 The effect of density and network size
Following the literature on the evolution of cooperation in networks [37], we studied the
consequences of varying the connectivity. We increased the density of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random network progressively. In the experiments reported here, both the probability of
rewiring and that of adoption were equal to 0.1. This meant that we selected parameter
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conditions that were on the frontier between the area in which cooperation was sustained
and the area in which it disappeared. It follows from this that the results for cases in which
Prew > Padopt would be even more pronounced.
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Figure 5: The effect of the probability of existence of each tie (Plink) on the final proportions
of agent types and on the final proportion of negative signs. Left Panel: results in the
absence of conditional players. Right Panel: results in the presence of conditional players.
In all simulations N=200, Prew = Padopt = 0.1, Pneg = 0.2, Pneg = 0.1 and Prand = 0.01. The
network signs are initially randomly positive or negative with equal probability.
As Figure 5 shows, in the absence of emotional strategies, the proportion of the agents
of each type remains very similar to the initial value of 0.5, regardless of network density. In
contrast, when CONDs are added, increasing the density progressively increases the propor-
tion of UCs in the final population, up to the point where they come to constitute the whole
population. At the same time, the final proportion of conditional players, defectors and
negative signs becomes negligibly small. Therefore, in our model when emotional strategies
are introduced, higher density leads to a significant increase in cooperative behavior. This
intriguing result is in contrast with the one obtained for unsigned networks by [37], which
shows how an increase in density leads to a decrease in cooperation.
This result follows from the combination of some rewiring (without which UD dominates)
and the presence of conditional players (without whom the UC strategy does not diffuse).
As the density increases, the average agent becomes more connected and thus it takes more
rewiring (i.e., more time) to create disconnected clusters of strategies. This provides more
time for the combination of COND and UC strategies to locally outperform UD, thus dif-
fusing cooperation.
To conclude our analyses, as a further robustness check of our results, we studied the
influence of network size on the evolution of cooperation. Once again, we fixed all parameters
at their baseline values (the rewiring and adoption probabilities were fixed at 0.1, while the
network density was 0.05) and we increased network size progressively. Increasing the size
(Figure 6) simply reinforced our results, making them more pronounced in the sense that the
proportion of UCs becomes even more dominant than in smaller networks. This reassures
us about the fact that the results observed are not artifacts of small-network noise effects.
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Figure 6: The effect of the network size on the final proportion of agent types (Left Panel)
and on the final proportion of negative and positive tie signs (Right Panel). In all simulations
Prew = Padopt = 0.1, Pneg = 0.2, Pneg = 0.1 and Prand = 0.01. The network ties are initially
randomly positive or negative with equal probability and the probability of existence for
each of them is Plink = 0.05.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have suggested a new solution to the puzzle of the evolution of uncondi-
tional cooperation. We have shown that strategies that make use of the emotional content
of social relationships can act as catalysts, creating favorable conditions for the spread of
unconditional cooperation, while they do not gain dominance. This is a similar idea to [28],
who developed a simple mathematical model for the evolution of an idealized chemical sys-
tem to study how a signed network of cooperative molecular species arises and evolves to
become more complex and structured. In that paper, however, they used network signs to
represent catalytic and inhibitory interactions among the molecular species.
We have built a model in which the simple strategies of the single-shot PD are adopted
locally and network ties and signs co-evolve with interactions. The update of network ties
and of relational signs, however, are not part of the agents’ strategies and thus subject to
probabilistic updates and not to evolution. We have chosen this simple setup because we
wanted to model situations in which strategies are simple and agents have no memory of
interactions. Alternative interpretations and assumptions have been widely studied in the
network game literature [26, 27, 44].
We interpreted sign-dependent strategies as emotional strategies in relation to everyday
observations in that humans react with affection, liking, disliking, frustration, anger, com-
mitment, and gratitude to their various experiences in social dilemma interactions. In line
with the suggestion of [45], we highlighted the key role of emotions in the evolution of coop-
eration. A possible limitation of our study is that we did not let strategies mutate in order
to develop more fine-tuned emotional responses to their interaction experience.
The main result of this paper is that the emotional strategies can act as catalysts for
cooperation but they rarely gain dominance themselves, which resembles that of [36] about
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the role of TFT in structured populations. [36] observed that this strategy stimulates the
diffusion of cooperation when many defectors are present, but it is then taken over by other
strategies such as the Win Stay, Lose Shift.
Besides our main finding, we have determined key parametric conditions under which
this evolutionary catalysis takes place in populations similar to those typically assumed for
human ancestral communities [10]. The most important conditions that favor cooperation
are high rewiring probability, low adoption probability of strategies that perform better,
and high network density. This latter finding contradicts earlier observations [36, 37, 41]
on the evolution of cooperation in graphs, and thus confirms the importance of studying
the co-evolution of networks and cooperation on signed graphs in this context. The result,
however, is in line with the sociological literature that claims that a cohesive structure of
communities supports better cooperation than a sparse one [7, 25].
Another novelty of this study concerns the interaction between emotional strategies and
rewiring. In line with the literature on non-signed networks, we have found that the possibil-
ity of rewiring tense relationships enhances the chances of diffusion of cooperative behavior.
However, we have refined this result, showing that when rewiring happens too fast, the segre-
gation induced can also inhibit the diffusion of cooperation, as negative relations that could
potentially become positive do not have enough time to do so.
Finally, while we assumed an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random initial distribution of degrees in the
network, a natural extension of this paper would be to study more realistic topologies. In
particular, scale-free, small world, and core-periphery structures could be analyzed to test
the resilience of the results obtained in this work with the introduction of sign-dependent
emotional strategies. While some studies find that certain structures are more efficient
in sustaining cooperation [33], other theoretical and experimental studies do not find any
advantages due to topology in positive networks [18, 19, 22, 20, 43]. Which result applies to
signed networks remains an open question. We make a first step in the direction of answering
it in [39].
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Figure 9: Top Panels: Effect of the competing dynamics of adoption of strategies with
higher payoffs (vertical axis) and of rewiring of stressed links (horizontal axis) on the final
proportion of negative ties in the network (Left Panels), of UDs (Central Panels) and of UCs
(Right Panels) for the case of completely random rewiring (Prand = 1). Lower Panels show
the difference between the case of random rewiring and the baseline in figure 4. The color
map is tweaked to highlight the most significant changes in proportions. In both cases and
in all simulations N=200, Pneg = 0.2 and Pneg = 0.1. The population at the outset is equally
divided among the three agents’ types. Network signs are randomly initialized positive or
negative with equal probability. The probability of existence for each tie is Plink = 0.05.
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